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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Whether the Commission's determination of the deficiency of the
Petitioner, Tummurru, to pay sales tax is correct ?
A. Whether the Commission correctly disallowed any sales exemptions by
Tummurru under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-106 ?
B. Does the sales to out of state purchasers meet the requirements of
interstate commerce to be exempt from Utah sales tax ?
C. Whether Tummurru's purchases of building materials should be taxed
under Utah sales ?
D. Should penalties be imposed on Tummurru's negligence for failure to
pay Utah sales tax ?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TUMMURRU TRADES, INC.
Petitioner/Plaintiff
v.

Appeal No. 89-0209

THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
Respondent/Defendant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1) (1989).
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case
The Petitioner/Plaintiff, hereinafter Tummurru, has appealed the Formal
Decision of the Utah Tax Commission entered against Tummurru for sales taxes
assessed by the Defendant/Respondent, hereinafter Division.
Relief Sought on Appeal
Tummurru seeks on appeal that the Utah State Tax Commission's
decision, that Tummurru pay the sales tax at issue, be overruled.
Statement of Facts
Tummunu with its legal place of business in Hildale, Utah, was sent, by
the Auditing Division of the State Tax Division of Utan, hereinatter Division, a

Statutory Notice of Deficiency and Sales and Use Tax Assessment Audit Report on
January 29, 1988.
A Petition for Redetermination was filed by Tummurru in response to the
Statutory Notice of Deficiency and Sales and Use Tax Assessment Audit Report.
Tummurru claimed that the deficiency, as determined by the Division, and the
amount in dispute, is in error. Tummurru's allegation of error on the part of the
Division is based on the following reasons: First, that the Division improperly
disallowed exempt sales; second, the Division improperly included as a part of
taxable sales amounts representing the assumed material costs of out of state
sales.
The Utah State Tax Commission, hereinafter Commission, ruled that
Tummurru's sales were not exempt sales under any Utah Code provision and that
the sales failed to meet the requirements of selling materials in interstate
commerce. Tummurru Trades. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n.
Utah Tax Comm. Appeal No. 88-1254 (Apr. 26, 1989) [hereinafter Commission's
Decision].
In answer to Tummurru's Brief the Commission denies that it erred in
determining the sales tax that Tummurru is alleged to owe. The subsequent
paragraphs will establish the Commission's position that no error was made in the
Statutory Notice of Deficiency and Sales and Use Tax Audit Report mailed to
Tummurru on January 29, 1988; and the Commission is correct in its application of
Utah law to the fact situation when it made its decision on April 26, 1989.
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition In the Tax Commission
The audit period in question is October 1, 1984 through September 30,
1987. The Division assessed Tummurru for sales made by Tummurru to determine
if Tummurru had paid all sales tax required by Utah law. Notification was sent to
Tummurru of the deficiency in the form of a Notice of Deficiency and Sales and
Use Tax Assessment Audit Report on January 29, 1988. Tummurru petitioned the
Commission claiming an error. The Commission held a formal hearing to decide
the issues presented by Tummurru. After hearing all the evidence, the
Commission held the Division did not make an error in its assessment of
Tummurru's sales, Tummurru's sales were not interstate commerce, and that
Tummurru's sales were not exempt under Utah law. The Commission, based on
its findings, ordered Tummurru to pay the sales tax owed under the Notice of
Deficiency.
On May 8, 1989, Tummurru filed a Petition for Reconsideration. The
petition requested the Commission to reconsider its position that Tummurru should
pay the sales tax. The Petition for Reconsideration was denied on June 21, 1989.
Tummurru Trades. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax ComrrTn. Utah (No.
88-1254) (June 21, 1989). The basis for denial was that Tummurru "failed to set
forth any mistake of law or fact or sent forth any new evidence that has been
discovered." id. at 2. Tummurru filed its petition for review with this Court on May
26, 1989. On appeal Tummurru requests that the Commission's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision dated April 26, 1989 be overruled.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Tummurru should not be granted a decision by this Court that would
overrule the Commission's Decision. The Commission was correct in concluding
that Tummurru is liable for the sales tax in question.
Tummurru failed to comply with § 59-12-106 in keeping records of
exemption certificates. Failure to keep such certificates subjects Tummurru to the
liability of sales tax not collected from those given exempt status by the
Commission.
Purchases made in the State of Utah are governed by laws that focus on
the transaction of the sale. All sales in the present case were made within Utah,
either because all the incidents of the transaction occurred in Utah or because
Tummurru has failed to met certain requirements of Utah law to qualify for an
exemption.
Materials purchased by out of state purchasers should not be exempt.
Tummurru has not demonstrated that Utah laws governing sales tax exemptions
for interstate commerce sales have been met. Specifically, Tummurru has not
come forth with sufficient evidence to prove the sales were required to be
delivered out of state or that such sales were actually delivered out of state.
Finally, Tummurru cannot prove that the sales are protected by the Constitution of
the United States because common law has ruled against similar fact situations.
All the incidents of sales of building materials to Tummurru for real
property improvements out of Utah occurred in Utah, thereby Utah sales tax is
owed by Tummurru.
Therefore, Tummurru's appeal should be denied and penalties imposed
based on the preceding summary of the subsequent arguments. This Court
should not overrule the Commission's Decision, but affirm the decision.
-4-

STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's standard of review, in the present case, is Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4). Pursuant to § 63-46b-16(4) this Court can only grant relief if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that Tummurru, has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the criteria in the subsections of § 63-46b16(4). The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1 to 21 (1989), "is applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or
before an agency on or after January 1, 1988." Stegan v. Department of
Employment Sec. 751 P.2d 1160, 1162 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
ARGUMENTS
I. THE DIVISION'S DETERMINATION OF THE DEFICIENCY OF THE
PETITIONER. TUMMURRU. TO PAY SALES AND USE TAX IS
CORRECT UNDER UTAH LAW.
A. THE DIVISION CORRECTLY DISALLOWED ANY SALES
EXEMPTIONS BY TUMMURRU. AS A SELLER OF TANGIBLE
PERSONAL PROPERTY, UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 59-12-106.
The issue here is whether Tummurru has correctly followed Utah law in
keeping records of exemption certificates for sales of tangible personal property or
services. At the formal hearing with the Commission Tummurru admitted the fact
it had sold tangible personal property to exempt customers during the audit period.
Transcript of Formal Hearing at 32 Tummurru Trades. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the
Utah State Tax Comm'n. (No. 88-1254) [hereinafter Record]. The statute that
governs the requirement to keep exemption certificates is Utah Code Ann. § 5912-106. Section 59-12-106 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
For the purpose of the proper administration of this chapter and to
prevent evasion of the tax and the duty to collect the tax, it shall be
presumed that tangible personal property or any other taxable item
or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), sold by any person for
delivery in this state is sold for storage, use, or other consumption
in this state unless the person selling such property, item, or
-5-

service has taken from the purchaser an exemption certificate
signed by and bearing the name and address of the purchaser to
the effect that the property, item, or service was exempted under
Section 59-12-104. The exemption certificates shall contain
information as prescribed by the commission.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-106(2) (1987). The information that the commission has
prescribed that must be contained is clearly stated in Utah Admin. R. R865-1923S(1989).
Utah Administrative Rule, R865-19-23S, expressly outlines the
requirements for exemption certificates pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 5 9 12-106. Rule23S states:
Taxpayers selling tangible personal property or services to
exempt customers are required to keep records verifying the
nontaxable status of such sales.
Records shall include:
1. Sales invoices showing the name and identity of the
customer, and
2. Exemption certificates for exempt sales of tangible
personal property or services if the exemptions category is
shown on the exemption certificates.
The burden of proving that a sale is for resale or otherwise
exempt is upon the person who makes the sale. If any agent of
the Tax Division requests the vendor to produce a valid
exemption certificate or other similar acceptable evidence to
support the vendor's claim that a sale is for resale or otherwise
exempt, and the vendor is unable to comply, the sale will be
considered taxable and the tax shall be payable by the vendor.
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-23S(1) (1989). There was only one invoice that showed
the name and identity of the customer. Record at 50 ("HEARING OFFICER: There
has only been one invoice then, that C.T. Colley, number 10125, appears to be the
only one with an address on it, is that correct. MR. BULLOCK: 10125? MR.
TARBET: I believe that's correct." MR. BULLOCK: 10125? MR. TARBET: 1038,
-fi-

nope excuse me."). Tummurru did not provide sufficient evidence to show
exemption certificates were keep on record. Commissioner's Decision at 5; accord
Record at 58 (HEARING OFFICER: "You're trying to substitute his testimony for
the exemption certificates." MR. BULLOCK: "Exactly."). Tummurru is unable to
comply with the statute, thus the sale should be considered taxable and the tax
should be payable by Tummurru. Utah Admin. R. R865-19-23S(1)(E); see Jack W.
Miller. Excavating Contractor. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 516 N.Y.S.2d 352, 35354 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
Therefore, this Court should hold that Tummurru is liable for those sales
for resale for which it does not have exemption certificates for the purchasers
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-106, Utah Admin. R. R865-19-23S, -44S and
common law.
B. TUMMURRU'S SALES ARE TAXABLE WHEN THE.
TRANSACTION OCCURRED IN UTAH FOR THOSE SALES TO
OUT OF STATE PURCHASERS.
The administrative rules, e.g., Utah Admin. R. R865-19-02S, that govern
the sales and use tax focus on the transaction of the sale. Utah Admin. R. R86519-02S reads as follows:
A. The sales and use taxes are transaction taxes
imposed upon certain retail sales and leases of
tangible personal property, as well as upon certain
services.
B. The tax is not upon the articles sold or furnished, but upon
the transaction, and the purchaser is the actual taxpayer. . . .
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-02S (1989) (emphasis added). The focus of the
administrative rules is on the transaction.

-7

The present transaction involves tangible personal property, principally
building materials. Administrative Rule R865-19-31S governs the time and place
that the transaction creates a sale. The rule states:
Ordinarily, the time and place of a sale are determined
by the time and place that the contract is made
between the seller and the buyer. However, in all
cases, the intent of the parties is the governing factor in
determining both time and place of sale and is subject
to the general law of contracts. If the contract of sale
requires the seller to deliver or ship goods to a buyer,
title to the property passes upon delivery to the place
agreed upon unless the contract of sale provides
otherwise.
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-31S (1989). Therefore, determining when the sale
occurred between Tummurru's wholesale business and out of state purchasers will
determine whether Utah sales tax applies to Tummurru. It is the position of the
Division that the sales between Tummurru and out of state purchasers took place
within Utah. The subsequent paragraphs support this conclusion.

i. MATERIALS PURCHASED BY OUT OF STATE
PURCHASERS ARE NOT EXEMPT UNDER UTAH
LAW.
In order for materials purchased by Tummurru to be exempt under the
interstate commerce theory either Utah law or the United States Commerce Clause
must be satisfied.
Utah law, specifically Rules 44S and 58S, does not allow Tummurru to
claim an exemption from sales tax because the purchases by out of state buyers
does not involve interstate commerce. Section I. C. ii. of this Brief quotes the
requirements necessary for a sale to be exempt under Rule 44S and 58S, for the

-ft-

sake of redundancy those requirements will not be quoted in this section.

In this

section, and in particular the subsequent paragraphs, an application of Utah law to
the present facts will be made to demonstrate why Tummurru's sales to out of
state purchasers are not exempt.
Under Utah Administrative Rule 44S Tummurru fails to meet any of
subsection (B) requirements. First, the sale of material did not involve actual and
physical movement of the property across state line. The Commission correctly
concluded that Tummurru did "not maintain sufficient records to indicate the
matter was, in fact, shipped out of state and was an integral part of the sale."
Commission Decision at 5; accord Record at 82. Second, the movement across
state lines was not essential to the sale. Commission Decision at 5; accord
p

Record at 44-45, 50-51.

Third, there was no obligation on the Utah vendors to

A true and correct copy of Rules 44S and 58S are provided in Addendum I. The
Division adopts the same analysis and conclusion in I. C. ii. that Rules 44S and
58S can not be met for purposes of this section.
p

For example, quoting from the Record:
MR. TARBET: Counsel, may I ask one more question while we're
on that page. I'm confused again on this information on this
invoice. On it you've got delivered out of state written in the
middle. Do you see where I'm talking about.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. TARBET: Then at the bottom it says delivered by WC. Now
does that have anything to do with will call or is WC a person ?
THE WITNESS: It's filled by Alex Barlow, that's what the AB is, the
WC I don't know. WC generally implies will call and would be up
towards the top of the invoice, I don't know why the "delivered"
would have WC in it.

-Q-

make physical delivery of the material across state line. Commission's Decision at
5; accord Record at 50-51, 64, 83-84, 86-88. 3
The Commission decided that Mr. Holm's testimony was insufficient to
overrule the fact that most, if not nearly all of the invoices, contained W/C, i.e., will
call, stamped on them to indicate in the trade that the customer came and picked
up the materials. Commission Decision at 5. This Court should carefully weigh the
evidence and conclude the Commission's findings are supported by the evidence
and must be upheld. See. Ralph Child Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n.. 362 P.2d
422, 426 (Utah 1961).

* Cont. * Cont.
MR. BULLOCK: Okay, but your testimony was that even though it
had WC on it, it didn't necessarily mean they would pick it up?
THE WITNESS: Yes, in these particular instances.
MR. TARBET: Nor apparently does delivery absolutely always mean
it was delivered does it?
THE WITNESS: Right.
Record at 44-45, 50-51.
Quoting Mr. Cook's uncontested testimony the record states:
Q In your mind this morning after reviewing the exhibits that were
offered by Mr. Holm, do you think those records are adequate?
A No I don't think that they're adequate in every regard. I think
that the word—that the initials W slash C in my twenty years of
experience have never been used for any other term than will call
and I've never seen it put on an invoice where a customer didn't
pick it up. I think that they've made adequate records there,
proving that it's a taxable sale.
[d. at 64; see also Record at 45. Tummurru's invoices are marked as Exhibit 3 in
the RecorcTstarting at 106.
_-in_

Tummurru's facts are similar to the facts in Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe
Co. v State Tax Div . 369 P.2d 123 (Utah 1962), rev'd, 83 S.Ct. 925 (1963),4 the
United States Supreme Court stated that the state of Utah could levy and collect a
sales tax, since the passage of title and delivery to the purchaser took place within
the state of Utah

The Supreme Court stated*

In each case the material was manufactured to meet the
specifications of specific out of state jobs The contract
called for out of state shipment, and respondent set a
destination price which included the going common carrier
freight charges between the two points involved. But
delivery was made and title passed to the purchaser at
respondent's foundry in Provo. The purchaser then
transported the pipe with its own equipment to the
predetermined out of state destination The common
carrier tariff was credited 1o the purchaser.
The Utah Tax Division imposed upon respondent a
sales tax deficiency covering these sales
The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the Tax Division,
on the grounds that the certainty of interstate shipment
made the imposition of the tax on these shipments
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
State Tax Div v. Pacific. 83 S Ct at 925-26. The Supreme Court held
We reverse its judgment on the authority of International
Harvester Co v Department of Treasury. 322 U.S. 340,
345, 64 S Ct 1019, 88 L ed 1313, which holds on facts
close to those of this case that a State may levy and
collect a sales tax, since the passage of title and delivery
to the purchaser took place within the State.
Reversed.
id. at 926. The United States Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in State Tax
Div. v Pacific should be used for the present fact situation because the sales
United States Supreme Court cases are a guide and respectful consideration
should be given to them in this fact situation. See People v. Teresinski, 640 P 2d
753 (Cal. 1987); see Boeing Co v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665 (Wash 1987).

claimed to be made out of state were in fact delivered in Utah and title passed to
the out of state purchaser in Utah. Tummurru failed to prove that goods were
delivered and title passed from any other place than its lumberyard in Utah, thus
the same conclusion drawn in State Tax Div. v. Pacific should apply to Tummurru's
facts.
Under the United States Constitution, art. I, § 8, H 3 the Congress has the
power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes."
The Supreme Court of the United States has provided a four-part test,
stated in Complete Auto Transit. Inc. v. Brady. 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51
LEd.2d 326 (1977) and D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara. 108 S.Ct. 1619 (1988),
to determine whether a product is taxable under a State statute or whether the
product is protected by the interstate commerce doctrine. The United States
Supreme Court recognized the issue before this Court when it stated the following:
Even where Congress has not acted affirmatively to protect
interstate commerce, the Clause prevents States from
discriminating against that commerce. The distinction between
the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to
their health or safety and from fraud, even when those danger
emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to
retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their
economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in both our history
and our law. (Cite omitted.)
One frequent source of conflict of this kind occurs when a
State seeks to tax the sale or use of goods within its borders.
(Cite omitted.) This recurring dilemma is exemplified in what has
come too be the leading case in the area, Complete Auto
Transit. Inc. v. Bradv. 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076 51 LEd.2d
326(1977).
id. at 1622-23. In Complete Auto the Supreme Court of the United States used a
four-part test to uphold the state tax on the appellant's business of instate
—1 O—

transportation of motor vehicles manufactured outside the State. The Court
"found that the State's tax did not violate the Commerce Clause, because
appellant's activity had a substantial nexus with Mississippi, and the tax was fairly
apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and was fairly
related to benefits provided by the State." D.H. Holmes Co.. Ltd.. 108 S.Ct. at
1623. The four-part test used by the Supreme Court of the United States should
be applied to determine whether Utah sales tax is appropriate in the present fact
situation.
The first prong of the four-part test is "substantial nexus with the state."
Complete Auto. 430 U.S. at 277. Tummurru is a Utah Corporation with its principal
place of business in Utah. Tummurru's Brief at 3. Therefore, the first prong of the
standard is met.
The second prong of the four-part test is the tax must be fairly
apportioned. D.H. Holmes Co.. Ltd.. 108 S.Ct. at 1623. The tax is fairly
apportioned since Utah provides a credit against its saies tax ior use taxes that
have been paid in other states. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(29) (1987 & Supp.
1989). "We have no doubt that the second and third elements of the test are
satisfied. The Louisiana taxing scheme is fairly apportioned, for it provides a credit
against its use tax for sales taxes that have been paid to other States." D.H.
Homes. 108 S.Ct. at 1623. Therefore, using the analysis in D.H. Holmes. § 5 9 - 1 2 103(1) is fairly apportioned.
The third prong of the four-part test is "the tax must not discriminate
against interstate commerce." D.H. Holmes. 108 S.Ct. at 1624. The tax does not
discriminate against interstate commerce since it is compensatory in nature. The
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use tax compensates the state for revenue lost when residents purchase out-ofstate goods for use within the State. The sales tax compensates the state for
sales that occur within the state. The use tax is applied at the same rate as the
sales tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(2) (1987 & Supp. 1989). The Supreme
Court of the United States held in D.H. Holmes that a statute like § 59-12-103(2)
satisfies the third prong of the four-part test. The Court stated:
The Louisiana tax structure likewise does not discriminate
against interstate commerce. The use tax is designed to
compensate the state for revenue lost when residents
purchase out of state goods for use within the State. It is
equal to the sales tax applicable to the same tangible
personal property purchased in-state; in fact, both taxes are
set forth in the same sections of the Louisiana statutes. See
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 47:302 and 47:321 (West 1970 and Supp.
1988).
D.H. Holmes. 108 S.Ct. at 1624.
The final prong of the four-part test is "the tax must be fairly related to
services provided by the state." D.H. Holmes. 108 S.Ct. at 1623. Tummurru
receives the traditional public services provided by the state and enjoys the
protection of Utah law and its legal system. The Court in D.H. Holmes stated:
Complete Auto requires that the tax be fairly related to
benefits provided by the State, but that condition is also met
here. Louisiana provides a number of services that facilitate
Holmes' sale of merchandise within the State: It provides
fire and police protection for Holmes' stores, runs mass
transit and maintains pubic roads which benefit appellant's
customers, and supplies a number of other civic services
from which Holmes profits. To be surfe, many others in the
State benefit from the same services; but that does not alter
the fact that the use tax paid by Holmes, on catalogs
designed to increase sales, is related to the advantages
provided by the State which aid appellant's business.
id. at 1624. The State of Utah's tax is fairly related to the benefits it provides,
therefore, the fourth prong of the four-part test is met.
-.14-

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution does not
preempt § 59-12-103(1 )'s tax on the Tummurru. The rational for non-preemption
is that Tummurru meets the four-part test that the United States Supreme Court
set forth in Complete Auto and D.H. Holmes to evaluate the validity of state taxes
vis-a-vis the Commerce Clause.
Finally, because Tummurru's sales do not fall within the Commerce Clause
nor does Rules 44S, 58S and § 59-12-103 exempt Tummurru from sales tax,
Tummurru's sales should be taxable in this state. Therefore, the Commission's
decision should be upheld by this Court based on the preceding paragraphs and
sections.
C. TUMMURRU'S PURCHASE OF BUILDING MATERIALS
SHOULD BE TAXED WHEN THE TRANSACTION OCCURRED.
The administrative rules that govern the sales and use tax focus on the
transaction of the sale. Administrative Rule 865-19-02S, -31S.
The present transaction involves tangible personal property, principally
building materials. Under Utah law when the transaction occurred between
Tummurru's wholesale business and Tummurru's general construction will
determine whether the sales and use tax applies to Tummurru, and if Tummurru
should pay Utah sales and use tax on the materials purchased.
Tummurru states in its brief that it "used building materials which it had
purchased within the State of Utah and had transported them out of state (i.e. to
Arizona, New Mexico or Nevada) to be used by them in the construction of the
out-of-state improvements." Tummurru's Brief at 9, Tummurru Trades. Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. (No. 89-0209). It is clear from the
facts, that if Tummurru purchased and took possession of material from Utah
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vendors in Utah, Tummurru is the taxable party and that Utah sales tax should be
paid by Tummurru. See Levine v. State Bd. of Equalization of the State of
California. 299 P.2d 738 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
Tummurru asserts it is entitled to several types of exemptions, thereby
escaping taxation Utah sales and use tax. The subsequent sections address this
claim and conclude that Utah is the appropriate state to impose the sales tax on
Tummurru.
i. TUMMURRU HAS THE BURDEN THAT IT IS
ENTITLED TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
EXEMPTION, S 59-12-104(12).
In Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 617 P.2d 397
(1980) the Utah Supreme Court reviewed Tax Commission's rejection of taxpayer's
contention that fuels it had used in reconstruction of a causeway were not used to
operate motor vehicles on public highways and were thereby exempt from tax
assessed under Utah's Use Fuel Tax Act. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
Even though taxing statutes should generally be
construed favorable to the taxpayer and strictly against
the taxing authority, the reverse is true of exemptions.
Statutes which provide for exemptions should be strictly
construed, and one who so claims has the burden of
showing his entitlement to the exemption.
id. at 398. This burden is not met merely by showing a difference of opinion. It is
the position of the Division that Tummurru's position is merely an opinion
unsupported by law. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd.. 463 U.S.
159 (1983) the United States Supreme Court, quoting Norton Co. v. Department of
Revenue. 340 U.S. 534 (1951), states:

The general rule, applicable here, is that a taxpayer claiming
immunity from a tax has the burden of establishing his
exemption.
This burden is never met merely by showing a fair
difference of opinion which as an originally matter might
be decided differently.
id. at 175-76 (original emphasis).
a. IN THE PRESENT FACT SITUATION
TUMMURRU CLAIMS AN EXEMPTION FROM
UTAH SALES TAX THUS THE EXEMPTIONS
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST IT AND
TUMMURRU HAS THE BURDEN OF SHOWING
ITS ENTITLEMENT TO THE EXEMPTION
CLAIMED.
Tummurru is claiming it's purchases are exempt by the United States
Constitution and Utah law from Utah sales tax. If correct, purchases made by it
are exempt from sales tax pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(12). Because
Tummurru is claiming the exemption it has the burden of showing it is entitled to
the exemption. Parson Asphalt Products, 617 P.2d at 398. Tummurru, as the
Commission discusses in the subsequent section, has failed to meet this burden.
Its arguments fail to demonstrate that it's purchases are exempt by the United
States Constitution or Utah law. Therefore, Tummurru should be denied its claim.
Container Corp. of America. 463 U.S. at 175-76.
ii. MATERIALS PURCHASED BY TUMMURRU FOR
OUT OF STATE CONSTRUCTION OF REAL
PROPERTY IMPROVEMENTS IS TAXABLE
UNDER UTAH LAW.
Tummurru's construction of homes outside of the state of Utah does not
exempt it from paying sales tax on those materials taken from its inventory in
Utah. Utah law and common law address the issue raised by Tummurru in the
present case.
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Utah law provides that mere fact that commodities purchased in Utah are
transported beyond its boundaries, and therefore eligible for credit on sales and
use tax paid in another state, is not enough to constitute a sale interstate
commerce. Rule 44S, which was implemented pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 5 9 12-104, states:
A. Sales made in interstate commerce are not subject to the sales
tax imposed. However, the mere fact that commodities purchased
in Utah are transported beyond its boundaries is not enough to
constitute the transaction of a sale in interstate commerce. When
the commodity is delivered to the buyer in this state, even though
the buyer is not a resident of the state and intends to transport the
property to a point outside the state, the sale is not in interstate
commerce and is subject to tax.
B. In determining whether a sale is made interstate commerce
certain general principles will apply. Interstate commerce is not
recognized unless there is a movement of a subject of commerce
from a point within the territorial jurisdiction of one state across the
boundary line to a point within the territorial jurisdiction of another.
Each of the following three rules must be complied with to
constitute interstate commerce.
(1) The transaction must involve actual and physical
movement of the property sold across state line.
(2) Such movement must be an essential and not an
incidental part of the sale.
(3) The seller must be obligated by the express or
unavoidable impled terms of the sale or contract to sell,
to make physical delivery of the property which forms
the subject matter of the transaction across a state
boundary line to the buyer.

D. If property is ordered for delivery in Utah, from a person or
corporation doing business in Utah, the sales is taxable even
though the merchandise is shipped from outside the state to the
seller or directly to the buyer.
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-44S(A), (B), (D) (1989).
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Under Utah Administrative Rule 44S Tummurru fails to meet any of the
requirements. First, the sale of raw material to Tummurru did not involve actual
and physical movement of the property across state line. Record at 27-29, 67, 76,
87. The sale was between Tummurru, as a Utah wholesaler, and Tummurru, as a
general contractor, with title transferring in Utah. id. at 27-29. Second, there was
no movement across state lines, thus there is no question of whether movement
was an essential part of the sale. Id. Third, there was no obligation on the Utah
wholesaler to make physical delivery of the building material across state line. Id.
Rule 44S establishes liability of Tummurru to pay Utah ^ales tax because
the building materials (tangible personal property) were sold and delivered within
the state. Utah Code § 59-12-103(1 )(a), (1)(l) impose a tax on the purchase of
"retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state. . . ." Because the
tangible personal property is not interstate commerce these items are taxable
pursuant to Rule 58S. Rule 58S states:
Sales of materials and supplies to contractors for use in outof-state jobs are taxable unless sold in interstate commerce in
accordance with Rule R865-19-44S.
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-58S, which applies specifically to the present
fact situation, states:
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally subject
to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal property into
real property is the consumer of the personal property since he
is the last one to own it as personal property.
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or repair real
property; regardless of the type of contract entered into whether it is a lump sum, time and material, or a cost-plus
contract.

Under Utah law Tummurru would be the "ultimate consumer", and thus,
responsible to pay the sales' tax, if it took tangible personal property and converted
into real property improvements. It is evident from the facts that the homes built
out of state by Tummurru were constructed by materials purchased in Utah and
taken from Tummurru Trades Incorporated's inventory located in Utah.
Case law has applied several fact situations to Rule 58S and held that the
party who consumes the material in order to improve real property is the taxable
party and that Utah sales tax must be paid by that party. Ralph Child Constr. Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n.. 362 P.2d 422 (Utah 1961); Utah Concrete Products Corp. v.
State Tax Common.. 125 P.2d 408 (Utah 1942); see Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v.
Sterling Custom Homes Co.. 283 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1979).
Tummurru states that since it installed the material in another state that
some of these cases have no weight. The preceding cases are applicable in that
they stand for the legal conclusion that the ultimate consumer is the taxable party.
Application of the legal conclusions from the preceding case law to factual
situations similar to Tummurru would dictate Tummurru is liable for the sales tax
assessed on it by the Division.
In Ralph Child Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 362 P.2d 422 (Utah 1961)
the plaintiff, Child, a general contractor constructing telephone systems, buildings
and other facilities was determined by the State Tax Division to owe sales and use
tax on material purchased to construct telephone systems. Child purchased
telephone poles from Southam and Sons, a company here in Utah, and set them in
the ground under a general contract with the Emery County Union Telephone
Association, Inc. to construct a telephone system. Also, Child purchased other
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telephone supplies and equipment form Kellogg Switchboard and Supply
Company, an out of state company. Child installed the telephone poles in the
ground and attached them to and made them a part of the telephone system, not
as a separate sale to the telephone company but under a general construction
contract. The court stated, "[S]ince Child did not resell them, but installed them as
part of the telephone system, thereby becoming the ultimate consumer, Southam
is relieved from collecting and paying this sales tax under Section 59-15-5, U.C.A.
1953, and the sole liability to pay this tax was thereby shifted on to Child." Id. at
424.
Whether Tummurru converted the tangible personal property to real
property in Utah or out of state is not the critical factor in determining whom is
responsible as the ultimate consumer. The Division's position, as testified by
Kenneth Cook, managing auditor in the Auditing Division of the State Tax
Commission, in his testimony before the Commission, is as follows:
Mr. Cook: Okay, there should be no distinction between stick
built or modular because in the case of real property contractors,
according to Utah Law and Rule S 58, that contractor is the final
consumer, so—
Hearing Officer: Whether he builds it in his lot or he builds it in
Arizona ?
Mr. Cook: Right. Whether he builds it in his lot or where it's
built. When he takes possession of the materials according to Rule
S 58, he's the final consumer and if those materials were purchased
from a Utah source, the final consumer owes tax.

. . . And Rule 58 S very clearly says that a real property
contractor who's the last one to own personal property as personal
property is the final consumer in converting it to real property. So
what that means is that whenever they take possession of materials
within the state of Utah for the purpose of converting it into real
-21-

estate, they become the final consumer and it doesn't matter what
the law in another state does. In other words, even though the law
in Arizona imposes a gross receipts tax on the construction of the
real property facility, it's not a general sales tax and therefore,
Arizona doesn't give any relief if they had to pay sales tax in
another state. So when this particular thing happens they are in
fact, going to be paying tax on the same things twice. It's a
different tax, however.
Record at 74, 82.
The Division's position becomes apparent as being the correct position in
this issue by viewing the recent passage of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(34)
(1989). Effective July 1, 1989, the Legislature exempts:
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by
this chapter:

(34) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated
pursuant to contract into and becomes a part of real property
located outside of this state . . . .
id. It is obvious from the reading of this passage granting an exemption, as of
July 1, 1989, that the Legislature view this type of transaction traditionally this as
taxable; otherwise there would have been no need for the new exemption.
Therefore, given this fact situation Tummurru would not be exempt from Utah
sales and use tax prior to July 1, 1989. See Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245,
252 (Utah 1988).
Tummurru, incorrectly, asserts that it matters where the tangible personal
property is converted into real property. Under Utah law, i.e., Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-34, Utah Admin. R. R865-19-23S, -58S, that distinction is not relevant to
determining the taxable party when the tangible personal property is converted into
real property. This Court has not decided this issue; however this issue has been
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decided in other courts. Even though the following case is not controlling in this
Court it can be used for authority on this issue. Bayle v. Board of Review of
Industrial ComrrTn. 700 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1985).
In Levine v. State Bd. of Equalization of the State of California, 299 P.2d
738 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) the appellants were engaged in designing,
engineering, fabricating, selling, and installing water cooling towers, aerial towers
and industrial wooden products especially designed for industrial companies.
Appellant's business consisted almost entirely of items specifically engineered for
a particular customer. The raw material was placed in inventory, and after the
design and engineering work was done, the necessary raw materials were
withdrawn from inventory as needed, and fabricated in California for subsequent
erection and installation by the appellants on customers' job sites outside of
California. The appellant contended that the imposition of the tax violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court stated:
The appellants were engaged in the business of constructing
tanks and the items heretofore mentioned, which were fabricated
pursuant to contracts to be erected on real property outside of the
state. In our opinion they were, under the facts of these particular
cases, contractors within the meaning of the law of this state, and
were consumers. It was said in General Electric Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 111 Cal.App.2d 180, 187, 244 P.2d 427, 431: '* * *
Where the materials are combined with other materials so as to lose
their identity and become part of the completed structure the
contractor is deemed to be the consumer of such material * * *

Appellants further contend that extraterritorial effect is being
given to the California Sales and Use Tax Law in these cases in that
the contracting work was performed outside of the state of
California. The actual erection of the structures was only a portion
of the contracting agreement. The agreement to erect the
structures establishes the nature of the activities of the appellants
as a contractor. However, all of the incidents with which the instant
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cases are concerned, insofar as they involve the applicability of the
California Sales and Use Tax Law, are incidents which occurred in
California. The property was bought and delivered in California and
a sales tax would have been paid but for the giving of the resale
certificates; it was stored in California; it was determined that it
would be dedicated to the performance of a construction contract
and it was removed from storage in California, then fabricated in
California . . . .
id. at 743-44 (original emphasis). In the present case, Tummurru's facts are
similar to those in Levine. All of the incidents in the present case, insofar as they
involve the applicability of the Utah Sales and Use Tax law, are incidents which
occurred in Utah. The material was bought and delivered in Utah and a sales tax
would have been paid but for the giving of the resale certificate by Tummurru.
The materials were stored in Utah.
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It was determined in Utah that building

materials would be dedicated to the performance of a construction contract, they
were removed from storage in Utah, and fabricated in Utah.
D. THE PENALTIES IMPOSED ON TUMMURRU ARE CORRECT
AND SHOULD NOT BE DISALLOWED.
The penalties imposed by Utah law on Tummurru were correctly assessed
by the Commission because of Tummurru's failure to pay or accrue tax on

"Q. In connection with those out of state construction projects, where do you
get the materials?. A. The cheapest source. The way it general works out is a
certain percentage comes from Utah. Most of it comes from the closest
geographic source—geographic area." Record at 33 (Quoting Tummurru's
attorney Mr. Bullock).
"Q. So the materials that will go into your general contracting function don't
always come through your wholesale or retail, they go directly to your yard. A.
Right." Record at 67.
7

Record at 85-88.
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materials purchased for real property jobs, even those performed in Utah.
Section 59-12-107 states:
Any person failing to pay any tax to the state or any amount
of tax required to be paid to the state, except amounts
determined to be due by the Division under §§ 59-12-110
and 59-12-111, within the time required by this chapter, or
file any return as required by this chapter, shall pay, in
addition to the tax, penalties and interest as provided in
Section 59-12-110.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(19) (1987 & Supp. 1989). Tummurru's sales and use
tax was due and payable to the Division quarterly on or before the last day of the
month. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(8). Tummurru failed to submit the sales and
use tax imposed on it by Utah law, therefore, Tummurru should pay the tax and
penalty. Utah Code § 59-12-110 states, "If any part of the deficiency is due to
negligence or intentional disregard of authorized rules with knowledge thereof, but
without intent to defraud, there shall be added a penalty . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-110(5)(1987).
In Robert H. Hinckley. Inc. v. State Tax Div.. 404 P.2d 662 (Utah 1965), the
court held a penalty was discretionary on the part of the Tax Division and a penalty
would be omitted, if evidence were presented that the taxpayer was not negligent.
In Duval v. Brown. 333 A.2d 63 (Conn. C.P. 1974), the court upheld a penalty
imposed upon the taxpayer even though the taxpayer had relied upon the advice
of a professional accountant. In C & D Trailer Sales v. Taxation and Revenue
Dept. 604 P.2d 835 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979), the court held that a taxpayer's mere

"A. Well, when they file a return they don't identify what they're filing on. They
do in fact file sales tax returns but when our auditors examined the records they
found that even on the Utah real property construction work, they failed to pay
sales tax." Record at 85.
_OK_

belief that it was not liable for taxes is tantamount to negligence, and the imposed
penalty was appropriate. In Independent Iron Works. Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization. 334 P.2d 236 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), the taxpayer argued that
there was a legitimate dispute over such a tax. The court, however, did not find a
reasonable basis for such a belief. Therefore, the court held that the taxpayer
knew, or should have known, that the contested transaction was taxable.
The Utah Supreme Court in Twaits Co. v. Utah State Tax ComnVn. 148
P.2d 343 (Utah 1944) found the taxpayer liable for penalties and interest on the
basis of the statutory language.
Merely to set out the statute is sufficient answer to contractors'
contention that penalties and interest for failure to file a return are
not authorized thereby. 80-16-10, U.CA 1943 reads: . . .

These sections are self-explanatory, and clearly give the
commission the authority to assess the penalty and interest here
imposed.
id at 346. Section 59-12-107 is self explanatory, and clearly gives the
Commission the authority to assess the penalty and interest for negligence. See
Hincklev Inc. v. State Tax ComnVn. 404 P.2d 662 (Utah 1965). The record
supports the position that Tummurru was negligent in the present case.
Commission's Decision at 5-6; accord Record at 35-40, 85-88.
Therefore, based on Utah law and common law Tummurru should not only
pay the tax, but the penalty imposed.
CONCLUSION
Tummurru is liable for the sales and use tax imposed upon it by Utah law.
The preceding sections have analyzed the present issues and have demonstrated

that this conclusion is supported by the United States Constitution, Utah law, and
common law. This Court should affirm the Commission's Decision and find that all
incidents of Tummurru's sales occurred within the State of Utah; the Commission
correctly disallowed any sales exemptions because Tummurru has not complied
with Utah laws to exempt sales in interstate commerce, nor with Utah laws to
exempt sales by using exempt certificates; and the Commission appropriately
assessed Tummurru's purchase of building materials for out of state jobs under
Rules 44S and 58S.
DATED this

"

day of April, 1990.

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
by and through

BRIAN L. TARBET
Assistant Attorney General

-27-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Respondent's Brief, postage prepaid, this

J. Jay Bullock, Esq.
353 East 300 South
S.L.C., UT 84111

day of April, 1990, to the following:

ADDENDUM

R865-19-44S. Sales In Interstate Commerce
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-104
A. Sales made in interstate commerce are not
subject to the sales tax imposed. However, the mere
fact that commodities purchased in Utah are transported beyond its boundaries is not enough to constitute the transaction of a sale in interstate commerce. When the commodity is delivered to the buyer
in this state, even though the buyer is not a resident
of the state and intends to transport the property to
a point outside the state, the sale is not in interstate
commerce and is subject to tax.
B. Before a sale qualifies as a sale made in interstate commerce, the following must be complied with:
1. the transaction must involve actual and physical
movement of the property sold across the state line;
2. such movement must be an essential and not an
incidental part of the sale;
3. the seller must be obligated by the express or
unavoidable implied terms of the sale, or contract to
sell, to make physical delivery of the property across
a state boundary line to the buyer;
C. Where delivery is made by the seller to a
common carrier for transportation to the buyer
outside the state of Utah, the common carrier is
deemed to be the agent of the vendor for the purposes of this section regardless of who is responsible
for the payment of the freight charges.
D. If property is ordered for delivery in Utah from
a person or corporation doing business in Utah, the
sale is taxable even though the merchandise is
shipped from outside the state to the seller or directly
to the buyer.

R865-19-58S. Materials and Supplies Sold to
Owners, Contractors and Repairmen of Real
Property Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections
59-12-102 and 59-12-103
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors and repairmen of real property is
generally subject to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal property
into real property is the consumer of the personal
property since he is the last one to own it as personal
property.
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or
repair real property; regardless of the type of contract entered into - whether it is a lump sum, time
and material, or a cost-plus contract.
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the
tax nor is the labor performed on real property. For
example, the sale of a completed home or building is
not subject to the tax, but sales of materials and
supplies to contractors and subcontractors are
taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. This
is true whether the contract is performed for an
individual, a religious institution, or a governmental
instrumentality.
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable institutions and government agencies are exempt only if
sold as tangible personal property and the seller does
not install the material as an improvement to realty
or use it to repair real property.
B. If the contractor or repairman purchases all
materials and supplies from vendors who collect the
Utah tax, no sales tax license is required unless the
contractor makes direct sales of tangible personal
property in addition to the work on real property.
1. If direct sales are made, the contractor shall
obtain a sales tax license and collect tax on all sales
of tangible personal property to final consumers.
2. The contractor must accrue and report tax on
all merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to improve or repair real property.
Books and records must be kept to account for both
material sold and material consumed.
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors
for use in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless sold
in interstate commerce in accordance with Rule R86519-44S.
D. This rule does not apply to contracts whereby
the retailer sells and installs personal property which
does not become part of the real property. See Rules
R865-19-51S, R865-19-59S, and R865-19-78S
for information dealing with installation and repair
of tangible personal property.

